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(({T]he Board noted that the NLRB is not intended to be (a forum in
which to rectify all the injustices of the workplace. "'1
I.
INTRODUCTION
The year
Wagner Act.2

2005

marks the seventieth anniversary of the passage of the

Although most celebrations and festivities will await the

centennial anniversary, it is an appropriate time to consider what role the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the Act")3 plays in the current law
of the workplace and what the future holds for the oldest labor law in the
United States.

Such consideration seems warranted particularly in light of

recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the
Board").

One possible role for the NLRA is that it could be interpreted

broadly as establishing important workplace rights and protections for both
union and nonunion employees.

An alternative possibility is that the Act

could be interpreted narrowly as applying almost exclusively to the
declining population of union workers in the United States, 4 and
restrictively even as to them. Either role is possible, and which of the two
prevails depends largely upon how the National Labor Relations Board
interprets section 7 of the NLRA. 5 Section 7 sets out the basic rights under
the Act. It reads, in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities

.

.

.

.

6

Just three years ago, I wrote an article in which I argued that the

NLR.A, based on the National Labor Relations Board ' s interpretations,

I. Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *3 n. l 5 (Oct. 15, 2004)
(quoting Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882,888 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 148 1
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 4 8 7 U.S. 1205 (1988)).

2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 499 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 15 1-69 (2004)).

3 . The current National Labor Relations Act is the Wagner Act, a s amended b y ch. 120 of the
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, 6 1 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 5 1 9 ( 1959).
4. The percentage of employees in the United States represented by unions has declined from a
peak in the early 1950s of approximately 36% of the workforce. See Right-to-Work Advocates Mark
Labor Day with Calls for Repeal of National Labor Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-l l
(Sept. 2, 2005). The current level is about 12.5% of the workforce and 7.9% of the private workforce.
Union Membership Rate Dropped in 2004 to 12.5 Percent, Continuing 20-Year Decline, Daily Lab.
Rep . (BNA) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2005). ln 1983, the first year for which the Bureau of Labor
Statistics has comparable data, the level of union membership was 20.1%. Jd.
5.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).

6.

!d.
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could be an important source of rights and protections for nonunion
workers. 7 I asserted that an expansive interpretation of the Act was needed
and desirable because the NLRA' s section 7 rights, when applied to
nonunion workers, provide important general protections not available
under other laws.

Although some of the section 7 rights are linked to

unions and collective bargaining, employees who are neither members of a
union nor seeking to be represented by a union can engage in conduct
protected by section 7 when their conduct is 1) concerted and

2)

for the

purpose of mutual aid or protection. 8 Whereas other individual employment
laws9 protect certain specific rights, the NLRA protects the general right of
employees to engage in unspecified concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection.10 I argued in my previous article that this general section 7 right
could do more to protect workers than the effort to pass new state or federal
legislation not only because it is increasingly difficult to enact such
legislation in a globally competitive world but also because participating in
concerted activity empowers employees to speak up to their employers and
to engage with them on key aspects of the employment relationship.
At the time I wrote that article, the NLRB' s decisions interpreting
section 7 seemed to permit coverage of a broad range of employee conduct
regardless of whether employees were represented by a·union. However, in
the short period since my original article, several NLRB decisions have
shifted the law under the NLRA toward a more restrictive, pro-employer
interpretation of section 7.11

Three recent Board decisions, considered

7. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Eve1ything Old
Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259 (2002).
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, I 1 02- 1 1 04 ( 1 962); Abramson,
LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 2005 WL 2094298, at *3 (Aug. 26, 2005). Although those two requirements
may be more easily satisfied when employees are represented by a union, they also may be satisfied
when no union represents employees. See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 ( 1 997).
The statutory phrase "for . . . mutual aid or protection" has generally been interpreted to mean that there
must be a connection between the conduct and the interests of the employees as employees. See Eastex
v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1 978). Thus, whether the requirement is satisfied is usually determined by
how closely the conduct is connected with working conditions. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN &
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
§ 1 6.3 ( 1 976). Even when conduct satisfies the dual requirements of "concerted" and "for mutual aid or
protection," that conduct may lose its protected status if it is too violent, disruptive, or disloyal to the
employer. /d.; see also NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting), 346 U.S. 464, 471 -72 ( 1 953) (finding employees conduct to be "detrimentally disloyal");
Calvin William Sharpe, "By Any Means Necessary"-Unprotected Conduct and Decisional Discretion
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 B ERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 209-10 (1 999).
9.

This category includes all federal employment laws other than the NLRA.

10. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 575 (1992) (discussing the individual rights approach to workplace law compared with the
collective approach); Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REv. 687 ( 1 997).
I I. This trend has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Paul Galligan, New Directions for the NLRB:
Further erosion of Clinton-era rulings is probable, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, at 9; NLRB Continues to
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together, cause me to reach this conclusion:

IBM Corp. , 12 Holling Press,
Inc. ,13 and Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia Home, Inc. ("Lutheran
Heritage"). 14 Each of these decisions changes an aspect of the law that I
discussed in my earlier article.
While only IBM Corp. clearly overrules Board precedent, holding that
Weingarten right does not apply to nonunion employees, Holling Press
and Lutheran Heritage also represent important changes in the law.
Lutheran Heritage alters the Board's analysis of whether it is an unfair
the

labor practice for employers to maintain rules prohibiting aggressive or
hostile speech by employees.

potentially the most limiting

Holling Press,

of the three decisions, narrowly interprets the statutory requirement that
conduct be "for the purpose of . .. mutual aid or protection"15 in order to
gain protection under section 7.

Heritage

Although

Holling Press

and

Lutheran

involved unionized employees, the principles they articulate are

likely to have a more pronounced effect in removing section 7 protection
from nonunion employees. Union workers can more easily satisfy the
section

7

requirements

of "concertedness"

and

"for

mutual

aid

or

protection" than nonunion employees, and, even if such requirements are
not satisfied, union employees may still be covered by the other section 7
rights relating to collective bargaining.
A common theme in the three decisions is that each discusses, to
differing degrees, the employer's right and obligation, on pain of potential
legal liability, to maintain a harassment-free, civil, and safe workplace. To
enable

employers to

achieve

this obviously important

objective,

decisions narrowly interpret employee rights under section 7. In IBM
and

Lutheran Heritage,

the

Corp.

the Board limited employees' ability to claim

protection under section 7 in part out of its concern that employers should
be able to conduct investigations and maintain rules that help them avoid
liability for harassment. Ironically, the Board in

Holling Press

held that

section 7 did not protect an employee pursuing a state law sexual
harassment claim when she aggressively sought the assistance of a co
employee as a witness. I find it troubling that the agency charged with
interpreting and enforcing the NLRA would read it so narrowly in order to
avoid

potential

conflict

with

other

laws

(principally

employment

discrimination laws)16 and in order to create a kinder, gentler workplace.

Make Changes, Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH), No. 890, Issue 1405 (Feb. 23, 2005); Ross Runkel, NLRB
Reversals
During
the
Bush
Administration,
Employment
Law
Memo,
http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/nlrbreversals.htm, (last visited on Oct. 18, 2005).
12.

341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742 (June 9, 2004).

13.

343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662 (Oct. 15, 2004).

14 .
15.

343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 (Nov. 19, 2004).
29 u.s.c. § 157 (2006).

16. See Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the
Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 605-08 (2005).
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sparked debate

about the proper role of the NLRA in the workplace and the role of the
Board in interpreting the Act. Some commentators argue that the NLRB' s
recent cases substantially narrow the coverage and protections of the Act,17
while others argue that the reversals do not signify anything significant.18
Indeed,

Board

members

themselves

disagree

about

the

potential

ramifications of their actions and whether their decisions aggressively
overrule precedent.19
It is, admittedly, a precarious endeavor to make broad assertions about
the movement of an area of the law based on decisions rendered over a
short period of time, especially because the law of the Board changes
frequently, depending in significant part on its political composition.20
Nevertheless, I undertake such a task in this article out of a sense of
obligation. The recent trends, decisions, and appointments at the NLRB21
indicate that the NLRA's future as a source of rights and protections for
nonunion workers will be insignificant at best.

Moreover, the Board's

17. Union, Management Attorneys Disagree On Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, Daily L.
Rep. (BNA) No. I03, at C-1 (May 3 1 , 2005) (reporting the comments of AFL-CIO General Counsel Jon
Hiatt); Galligan, supra note II, at 9 (reviewing decisions reversing or narrowing interpretations by the
Clinton Board and making predictions regarding possible future reversals); Susan J. McGolrick, AFL
CJO Counsel, Management Attorney Both Fault New Direction ofLabor Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1 9, at A-7 (Jan. 3 1 , 2005) (reporting comments of Jon Hiatt and Professor Samuel Estreicher).
18. Kenneth R. Dolin, Bush-Era NLRB Rulings, NAT'L L.J., June 1 3 , 2005, at 1 3 (arguing that
recent Board decisions can be characterized as applying established principles and standards); Union,
Management Attorneys Disagree On Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, supra note 1 7; see also
Robert J. Battista, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, Remarks at 58th NYU Annual
Conference on Labor (May 20, 2005), reprinted in NLRB Chairman Battista's Speech at New York
University's Labor Conference, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-1 (May 23, 2005).
19. See John Herzfeld, Members Schaumber, Liebman Discuss Differing Views on Recent Board
Decisions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 0 (March 1 0, 2005) (discussing comments of two Board
members at an American Bar Association Conference).
20. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. The Board consists of five members appointed
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate for staggered five-year terms. 29 U.S.C. § !53(a)
(2006). By custom and practice, three members are of the same political party as the President, and two
are of the other party. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000,61 OHI O ST. L.J. 1 3 6 1 , 1 3 72 n.4 1 (2000).
21. The Board now is at full strength with five members. On August 3 1 , 2005, the President
appointed Member Peter Schaumber to a recess appointment on the Board. Susan J. McGolrick,
Schaumber Gets NLRB Recess Appointment; White House Nominates New USCJS Director, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1 69 (Sept. I, 2005). Member Schaumber, a Republican, will serve until the Senate
adjourns its 2006 session. On January 4, 2006, the President appointed Peter N. Kirsanow, a
Republican, to a recess appointment. Kirsanow Appointment Pleases Business, But Democrats, AFL
CJO Criticize Action, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at AA-1 (Jan. 6, 2006). On January 1 7, 2006,
President Bush filled the last Board vacancy with the recess appointment of Dennis Walsh, a Democrat,
a term that ends when the Senate adjourns in 2007. See Walsh Named in Recess Appointment to Fill
Board's Remaining Vacancy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. II, at A-12 (Jan. 1 8, 2006). In most of the
Board decisions discussed in this article, Member Schaumber joined Chairman Battista and Member
Meisburg in the majority while Members Liebman and Walsh dissented (Members Meisburg and Walsh
were not on the panel in Holling Press).
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restrictive interpretation of section 7 will gradually diminish the rights and
protections for unionized employees as well.
Because of the Board's actions and the changing nature of the law, my
earlier recommendations and predictions are now questionable.

Thus, this

article hopes to call attention to what I think is an alarming trend in the
Board's decisions. Although the law under the NLRA may change again as
the composition of the Board changes, I am concerned that a vision of the
NLRA as part of the overall law of the workplace in the United States may
fade and be replaced by a view that the Act is just the labor law that applies
to unionized workers.
The following sections discuss the

Lutheran Heritage

IBM Corp., Holling Press,

and

decisions and consider their possible ramifications. I

conclude that the decisions narrow the NLRA in significant ways for both
union and nonunion employees.

Unfortunately, the Board's narrow

construction of the NLRA minimizes the Act's role in the overall labor and
employment law regime of this nation. Just three years ago, I thought it had
greater potential.
II.

IBM CORP.:

NARROWING THE

The Supreme Court held in

NLRB

v.

WEINGARTENRIGHT

Weingarten, Inc.

that an employer

commits an unfair labor practice when it denies an employee's request to
have a union representative present at an investigatory interview that the
employee reasonably believes may result in discipline. 22 According to the
Court, this right emanates from section 7 of the NLRA's protection of
activity that is concerted and for mutual aid or protection. The

Weingarten

Court left it to the Board to address a question that has spawned five
decisions and four changes of law over a twenty-two year period: whether
employees who are not represented by a union have a similar right to be
accompanied by a co-employee at an investigatory interview that might
result in discipline.
In the first decision to address this question, Materials Research
the Board held that the

Corp.,

Weingarten right does extend to nonunion
Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Board reversed
its position, holding that the Weingarten right is not rooted in section 7 and
does not extend to nonunion employees.24 Three years after Sears, the
Board modified its position again in E.I. DuPont De Nemours.25 There, the
Board held that non-application of the Weingarten right to nonunion
employees.23 Three years later in

22. 420 u.s. 25 1 ( 1 975).
23. 262 N.L.R.B. 1 0 1 0 ( 1 982).
24. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 ( 1 985).
25. 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (I 988).
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employees is a pennissible but not a mandatory interpretation of the NLRA,
and it chose to adhere to nonextension of the right.26

Subsequently, in

Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio27 the Board overturned Sears and
DuPont and restored its holding in Materials Research: the Weingarten
right emanates from section 7 and is "equally applicable" regardless of
whether the employee requesting accompaniment in the interview is
represented

by

a union.

The

Board

explained

that

extending

the

Weingarten

right to nonunion employees "effectuates the policy that

'Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no wise [sic]
dependent on union representation for their implementation. "'28
Most recently, in

IBM Corp.,

the Board changed its position on this

issue for a fourth time.29 It overruled
its

DuPont

holding.

Epilepsy Foundation

and returned to

Either interpretation of the NLRA is permissible,

stated the Board, but it chose, on policy grounds, not to extend the

Weingarten

right to unrepresented employees. In

IBM Corp.

the employer

interviewed several employees in connection with an investigation about a
charge of harassment made by a former contract employee.

After the

employer conducted a few interviews, some employees detennined that
they had a right to have a co-employee present as a witness in future
interviews.

These employees discovered they had this right through

different means. For example, a suspended manager (and former military
officer) advised one interviewee that, based on his military experience, the
employee should ask for a witness at such interviews. Another employee
said he "searched the web" and determined that he had a right to have a
representative present. 30
The employer denied the workers' requests to have a co-employee
present.

In fact, the supervisor conducting the interviews denied that the

employees even requested accompaniment at the interviews.31

However,

the employees filed a unfair labor practice charge and the administrative
law judge who initially heard the case found that they made such requests
and that their requests were denied.32 Relying on

Epilepsy Foundation,

the

ALJ found that the employer violated section 8(a)( l ) of the Act,33 which

26.

Jd. at 630-3 1 .

3 3 1 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), ajJ'd in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1 905 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ), cert. denied,
536 u.s. 904 (2002).
28. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, 3 3 1 N.L.R.B. at 678 (quoting Glomac Plastics, Inc.,
234 N.L.R.B. 1 309, 1 3 1 1 (1978)).
27.

29.

34 1 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at * 1 0- 1 2 (June 9, 2004).

30.

Id. at *37-40.

31 .

Id. at *40.

32.

Jd. at *I.

"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to- (1 ) interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 1 5 7 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1 58(a)(l )
(2006).
33.
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makes it an unfair labor practice to interfere with the exercise of rights
guaranteed by section 7.

The Majority: Policies-Increasing Need for Workplace Investigations
and the Jeopardy Posed by Extending the Weingarten Right

A.

The Board majority overruled the ALJ and reversed course from
Returning to its holding in

Epilepsy Foundation.

DuPont,

the Board frrst

stated the Act can be interpreted to either extend or deny the

Weingarten

right to employees not represented by a union.34 The Board then chose to
withhold the Weingarten right from non-union
Epilepsy Foundation. The Board reasoned

workers, thereby reversing
that the "ever-increasing

requirements to conduct workplace investigations"35 brought about by
changes in the laws prohibiting workplace discrimination and sexual
harassment, the rise in incidents of workplace violence, and the events of
September

11, 2001,

made extending the right imprudent.36 In light of the

increasing need to conduct investigations, the Board found that the policy
concerns expressed in

DuPont

all counseled against giving nonunion

employees the right to have co-workers present at investigatory interviews.
Specifically, the Board focused on the fact that co-workers, unlike union
representatives, do not represent the interests of the entire workforce, do not
level the power imbalance between employer and employee, do not have
the

skills

of

union

representatives,

and

increase

the

chances

that

confidential information will be compromised.37

B.

The Concurrence: Proving Section 7 Coverage
and Common Law Prerogatives ofEmployers

In his concurrence, Member Schaumber agreed with the majority on
the policy rationale for overturning

Epilepsy Foundation, but he gave
Weingarten right to nonunion employees.
Epilpesy Foundation was wrongly decided because it

additional reasons for denying the
He argued that

presumed the concerted nature of the conduct rather than requiring
additional proof of concertedness. 38

Epilepsy Foundation,

Member Schaumber claimed that in

the Board erroneously presumed that nonunion

employees satisfied the section 7 requirements of concertedness and action
"for mutual aid or protection" whenever they requested accompaniment
merely because

Weingarten

held that similar requests made by union

employees satisfied both provisions of section 7.

Although Member

34.

IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 1 48, 2004 WL 1 335742, at *2 (June 9, 2004).

35.

/d.

at *3.

36.

/d.

at *6.

37.

/d.

at *6-8.

38.

/d.

at * 1 9 (Schaumber, Member, concunin g).

WORKPLACE DECOR UM WIT HOUT L IA B IL ITY
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Schaumber mentioned the two requirements, he focused his criticism of

Epilepsy Foundation

on its presumption of concertedness when a nonunion

employee requests the presence of a co-worker at an interview. He claimed
that the Board in

Epilepsy Foundation had relied on a discredited analysis
Alleluia Cushion39 decision rather than on the
outlined in the controlling Board precedent of Meyers II.40

of concertedness from the
correct analysis

The requirements of concertedness and for mutual aid or protection are
separate and distinct requirements, emphasized Member Schaumber, and he
argued that each must be proved using the appropriate analysis.41
Thus, Member Shaumber claimed that asking a co-worker to attend an
investigatory interview was not necessarily concerted activity protected by
Additionally, he contended that in the absence of a collective

section 7.

bargaining agreement, management has a "common law right" to deal with
employees on an individual basis and that extending
nonunion employees violates this rightY

Weingarten

to

By requiring separate proof for

the concertedness and mutual aid prongs of section 7 and then by narrowly
defining what qualifies as concerted, Member Shaumber leaves little room
for the NLRA to function outside of a union setting.

As I will discuss

below, the Board majority in Holling Press, would further limit the reach of
the Act by narrowly interpreting what qualifies as "for mutual aid or
protection. "43
C.
The

The Dissent: Making the NLRA Less Applicable
to Nonunion Workers

dissent

overturning

by

Members Liebman

Epilepsy Foundation

and

Walsh recognized

that

would make the NLRA less relevant in

the contemporary workplace and deny nonunion employees a right that
might have some value to them. Initially observing that "[t]he decision to
overrule a recent precedent, carefully reasoned and upheld in the courts,
should be based on far more compelling reasons than our colleagues have
articulated," 44 the dissent questioned whether the majority had made a
convincing case that extending the

Weingarten

right to nonunion workers

would significantly interfere with the increasing number of investigations
required or encouraged by other laws.

Even assuming such a case were

established, the dissent questioned why, in balancing the section 7 rights of

39.

22 1 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).

40. 28 1 N.L.R.B. 882 ( 1 986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 148 1 (D.C. Cir. 1 987),

cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).

41. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *22 (June 9, 2004) (Schaumber,
Member, concurring).
42. /d. at * l 7.
43.

See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.

44. IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *32 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, dissenting).
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the NLRA against employers' concerns under other laws, the NLRA
categorically

must

lose.45

The

dissent

also

challenged

Member

Schaumber's analysis of the concertedness requirement, arguing that he
incorrectly interpreted

Epilepsy Foundation

and

Materials Research

as

being based on a rejected view of concerted activity and that he erred in his
analysis of how

applies to a nonunion employee requesting

Meyers II

accompaniment. 46

Critique of iBM

D.
The

IBM Corp.

Corp.

dissent establishes the starting point for critiquing the

majority's opinion, namely whether the policy concerns cited by the
majority have, as the Board stated, taken on new vitality.

The majority

wrote of changes in the workplace in recent years, 47 a period it left
undefined, and stated that the need for investigatory interviews had
increased

since

Weingarten

However,

Weingarten.

workplace

changes

since

do not seem to be relevant. Not only did the Board not suggest

that such changes made the right of union employees less compelling, but
the Board failed to explain what workplace conditions had changed since

Epilepsy Foundation, the Board's most recent case on the

issue. Regardless

of the time period to which the Board referred or should have referred, the
rationale

of

changed

conditions

investigations rings hollow.

and

increased

need

for

workplace

Laws prohibiting sex discrimination and

harassment in the workplace, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,48 existed long before the Board in
extended the

Weingarten

Materials Research Corp.

right in the nonunion context.

first

If the need to

conduct investigations into allegations of harassment counseled against
extension of the

Weingarten

right then why did the Board in

Materials

Research even reach the decision that it did?
Perhaps the IBM Corp. majority meant that court decisions on sexual
harassment since DuPont or Epilepsy Foundation emphasized the need for
prompt and effective investigations of sexual harassment,49 but it did not
say that. In fact, court cases have long established that employers need to
investigate and promptly and effectively address complaints alleging sexual

45.

/d. at *33.

46.

/d. at •32.

47.

IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No . 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *6 (June 9, 2004).

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e15) (2004).
48.

49. The most obvious example would be the analytical framework for harassment perpetrated by
supervisors announced by the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1998) (holding employers strictly liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors that results in
a tangible employment action, but providing employers with an affirmative defense to harassment that
does not result in a tangible employment action), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
805-06 (1998) (same).
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Thus, it is difficult to understand the Board's concern about

changes in the law increasing the need for prompt investigations of sexual
harassment.
hollow.

The Board's concern with workplace violence also rings

Perhaps the number of incidents of workplace violence has

increased in recent years, but the Board did not substantiate that assertion.
Furthermore, it is not clear that more investigations are being performed
based on any such increase.
The invocation of

9/11

is the most unusual reason given by the Board

for the increase in workplace investigations. It seems that the reference to

9/11

is simply a mantra: mention the tragedy of

9/11

and everyone accepts

that the world has changed and that any modifications made in reaction to
that changed world are justified.5° Certainly, the Board's use of
basis for limiting the

Weingarten

9/11

as a

right is not the only time that tragedies

and national security have been used to justify a limitation of legal rights, 51
but it may be the most inscrutable.
While

the

Foundation

Board

attempted

to

justify

its

reversal

of

Epilepsy

based on changed workplace conditions, 52 it might instead have

grounded its decision on a more straightforward rationale: this is simply an
issue on which the Board has vacillated over the years, and the current
Board believes that

DuPont

is the better result. 53

Certainly, the Board has

"changed its mind" several times regarding the extension of the
right

to

nonunion employees,

and courts

may defer

Weingarten

to the Board

notwithstanding the vacillations.54 Indeed, when the D.C. Circuit reviewed

Epilepsy Foundation

the petitioners argued that the Board had not

adequately explained the decision and had diverged from its
holding.

DuPont

The court did not think the level of deference should be

diminished by the shifting positions of the Board:
An otherwise reasonable interpretation of § 7 is not made legally infirm
because the Board gives renewed, rather than new, meaning to a disputed

50. The dissent ridiculed that reason: "[W]e would hope that the American workplace has not yet
become a new front in the war on terrorism and that the Board would not be leading the charge,
unbidden by other authorities." IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at"' 28 (Liebman and Walsh, Members,
dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh 'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945)
(upholding conviction of American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating order excluding persons of
Japanese ancestry from West Coast military area). Recent debate about limitation of civil liberties based
on national security concerns has focused on the Patriot Act. See, e.g., James B. Corney, Fighting
Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RicH. L. REv. 403 (2006).
52. Nonunion Workers Lose Weingarten Right, Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH), No. 867, at 2 (July
28, 2004) (quoting Professor Joan Flynn).
53.

!d.

In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the Supreme Court commented on deference to
the Board even when the Board changes positions: "[A) Board rule is entitled to deference even if it
represents a departure from the Board's prior policy." 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (citing NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975)).
54.
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statutory provision. It is a fact of life in NLRB lore that certain substantive
provisions

of

the

NLRA

compositions of the Board.

invariably

fluctuate

with

the

changing

Because the Board's new interpretation is

reasonable under the Act, it is entitled to deference.
. . . The Board's conclusion obviously is debatable (because the Board
has "changed its mind" several times in addressing this issue); but the
rationale underlying the decision in this case is both clear and reasonable.
That is all that is necessary to gamer deference from the court. . . . The
[petitioner's] challenge here is merely an attack on the wisdom of the
agency's policy, and, therefore, the challenge must fai1.55

Based on the Board's history with the
settings, one reaction to

IBM Corp.

Weingarten

right in nonunion

is to say simply that the Board has

changed its mind again and that this is neither surprising nor a big deal.
Another reaction to the

IBM Corp.

opinion is that the majority did less to

narrow section 7 rights than the approach advanced by the concurrence
would have because the majority agreed that both interpretations of section
7 are permissible and only overturned

Epilepsy Foundation

on policy

grounds.
However, despite purportedly limiting the nature of its holding and
despite the history of the Board's position on this issue, two aspects of the
majority opinion cause concern regarding the narrowing of section 7. First,
the majority had no qualms about overturning a recent Board decision even
when it represented a permissible interpretation of the Act. 56 Second, the
majority

opted for a narrower interpretation of section 7 when an

interpretation of the NLRA raised the specter of employer liability under
other laws. Why did the Board let potential employer liability under other
laws influence it to adopt a narrower interpretation of section 7 of the
NLRA?

Employers may face conflicting obligations under the various

labor and employment laws, and it is appropriate for the Board to take these
considerations into account in interpreting section 7.
and

conflicting

employers.57

obligations

do

pose

problems

These overlapping

and

challenges

for

Still, there is cause for concern when the Board reaches a

55. Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 & 1 1 02 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002).
56. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Board's rulings are entitled to deference even when
the Board changes positions. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. Still, some courts have shown
impatience with the Board's vacillations. See, e.g., Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203,
209-12 (5th Cir. 2001); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1 5 14 (D.C. Cir. 1 99 1 ) (Mikva, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] a reviewing court should accord the Board's vacillating interpretations of the Act no
particular deference."). One could speculate that the Board may, at some point, risk the deference that i t
should receive from courts when interpreting the Act, but that is speculation.
57. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7 , 1 8- 1 9 ( 1 988) ("One can scarcely imagine an arrangement better designed to hold out
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decision like
enforcing.

IBM Corp. and narrowly interprets the law it is charged with
IBM Corp. begs the question of whether the Board accurately

assessed potential employer liability under Title VII and other laws. 58 On
this point, the dissent correctly pointed out that the majority did not
adequately explain the peril to sexual harassment investigations posed by
extension of the

Weingarten

right.59

Further, even if the Board's

interpretation of the potential liability of employers under other laws was
accurate, one could also ask whether the Board should resolve the conflict
by narrowly interpreting the NLRA.

In my view, the Board should not

restrictively interpret the NLRA just to avoid potential problems for
employers under other laws. The Board should enforce the NLRA and not
spend as much time theorizing about potential conflicts with laws outside of
its jurisdiction. If a conflict develops between the NLRA and other laws in
ways that either pose difficulties for employers or jeopardize important
federal policy, the courts or Congress can act as a check and make
adjustments.

60

Further, the concurrence causes additional concern about limiting
section 7 rights for union and nonunion workers.

At first glance, the

concurrence's insistence that proof of the concerted nature of the conduct
should be required rather than presumed does not necessarily seem
unreasonable.

However, when the concurrence's narrow interpretation of

what qualifies as concerted is considered with the Board's decision in

Holling Press

which, as discussed below, narrowly interprets what qualifies

as "for mutual aid or protection" you suddenly have an NLRA that applies
to a very small range of activity.

Further, the concurring opinion's

insistence on the common law prerogatives of the employer in the absence

promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the legal
machinery."); Hodges, supra note 16, at 608.
58. See Hodges, supra note 16, at 605-06 (questioning whether agency considering another law
will accurately interpret that law and even if so, whether it will have a "nuanced understanding of the
legal implications of its interpretation").
59. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at * 28 (June 9, 2004) (Liebman and
Walsh, dissenting).
60. The Federal Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court can review decisions of the Board and
determine whether the Board is properly resolving conflicts between the NLRA and other e!llployment
laws. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) & (f) (2006). For example, the Supreme Court has considered cases in which
the breadth of the Board's discretion to fashion remedies for violations of the NLRA was at issue
because of possible conflict with other laws. The Supreme Court considered a case in which it decided
that the Board had overstepped its jurisdiction in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 533 U.S.
137 (2002). In that case, the Board ordered a backpay award to an undocumented alien worker who was
discharged by his employer for supporting a union. The Court held that the Board's generally broad
discretion to order remedies for violations of the NLRA is limited by federal immigration policy
evidenced in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. In contrast, the Supreme Court upheld
the Board's award of backpay to an employee who committed peijury at a compliance proceeding in
ABF Freight, System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
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of a collective bargaining agreement suggests that Member Schaumber sees
little role for the NLRA in the nonunion workplace.
In extending the
like

Foundation,

Weingarten right
Materials Research,

to nonunion employees,

Epilepsy

provided a significant statement

regarding the broad applicability of section 7 rights to nonunion employees.
The Board's reversal of

Epilepsy Foundation

in

IBM Corp.,

although

perhaps not that important practically-most nonunion employees probably
never knew they possessed the

Weingarten

right and employers did not

have an obligation to advise them of the right61:.._serves as a symbolically
meaningful

restriction of section 7 rights that leaves out nonunion

employees.62

This restriction makes the NLRA less relevant as a broad

source for worker protection.
III.
HOLLING

In

PRESS:

Holling Press,

NARROWING MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION

a 2- 1 panel decision, an employee complained to her

union steward that a supervisor had sexually harassed her. The union and
employer
meritless.

investigated, and

both

determined

that the complaint was

The complainant then contacted the state fair employment

practice agency. When another employee at the company mentioned that a
supervisor had made a sexually charged statement to her, the complainant
asked the coworker and another employee to testify before the state agency.
She added that if they refused to testify they could be subpoenaed.

On

learning of the employee's request that coworkers testify on her behalf, the
company first suspended her for threatening them and then terminated her
for trying "to coerce coworkers into collaborating an unsubstantiated charge
of sexual harassment."63
charge.

The employee then filed an unfair labor practice

The ALJ assigned to the case concluded that the employee's

conduct was not concerted within the meaning of section 7 because it was
not undertaken for mutual aid or protection and therefore dismissed the
charge. The Board then took the case on review.

61. See, e.g., Carlton J. Snow, Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts in Labor Law, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 3 1 9, 341 (2002) ("It is reasonable to conjecture that the vast majority of non-union
workers in the United States have no knowledge of their Weingarten rights."); Nonunion Workers Lose
Weingarten Right, supra note 52 (quoting Professors Charles Craver and Joan Flynn).
62. In a case decided in 2005, the Board held that nonunion employees engaged in 12-hour
peaceful work stoppage in their employer's parking lot were not protected by the NLRA because the
employees section 7 rights were outweighed by the employer's property interest. Quietflex Manuf. Co.,
344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 30, 2005 WL 1564870 (June 30, 2005). Dissenting, Member Liebman cited IBM
Corp. for the proposition that there is "a continuing erosion of the Section 7 rights of unorganized
workers." !d. at *II & n.5 (Liebman, member, dissenting).
63.

Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *I (Oct. 15, 2004).
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The Majority: Distinguishing Collective
and Individual Objectives

The majority initially disagreed with the ALJ and found that the
conduct at issue was concerted because the employee appealed to another
for help.64 However, the majority upheld the dismissal of the charge. The
majority stressed that the two requirements for section 7 protection
"concerted" and "for mutual aid or protection"-were separate and distinct
inquiries and that each must be satisfied.65

The majority saw the

complaining employee's aggressive language toward her co-workers and
the other employees' lack of interest in helping with the case as indicative
that no mutual purpose existed.

Instead, the Board found that the

complainant had pursued the claim only to benefit herself.66 The majority
rejected the argument that her conduct was for mutual aid or protection
because it might spare other employees from future sexual harassment. The
Board stated, "The bare possibility that the second employee may one day
suffer similar treatment, and may herself seek help, is far too speculative a
basis on which to rest a finding of mutual aid or protection."67
The majority's decision to deny section 7 protection to the employee in

Holling Press

raised a potential conflict with Board precedent.

discussed, the Board in

Weingarten

IBM Corp.

As just

had reiterated the validity of the

rule, namely that, at least in a union setting, an employee's

request for co-employee accompaniment at an investigatory interview was
protected conduct under section 7.

The

Holling Press

majority needed to

show why a request to have a co-worker employee at an investigatory
interview was for mutual aid or protection, but a request to have an
employee to testify in a hearing by a state agency investigating sexual
harassment was not.
The majority distinguished these scenarios on two grounds. First, the
majority argued that a request to have a coworker present at a workplace
investigation that may to lead to discipline is substantially different than
asking to have a co-worker testify at a hearing on your behalf. The former
satisfies the mutual aid prong of section 7 because discipline is an issue that
affects all employees, and it is likely that any coworker being asked to
provide accompaniment may herself be subjected to such an investigation
in the future. By contrast, the majority claimed that sexual harassment
claims are more uncommon and it is unlikely that the coworker will herself

64.

/d. at "'2.

65.

!d. at • t , '"3.

66.

/d. at •3.

67.

!d. at •4.
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Thus, the majority

claimed that there was not the same level of mutual interest or need for
mutual aid when an employee asks another worker to testify at a hearing.
Second, the majority stated that requests for accompaniment are more likely
to be for mutual benefit when made in the context of internal investigations
for the simple reason that internal workplace investigations are more
common than external suits or charges.69
Perhaps recognizing that the decision may deprive all employees
pursuing sexual harassment claims of section 7 protection, the majority
stated in a footnote that the complaining employee who solicited coworker
testimony might be protected by other laws.70 The majority seemed to be
saying its restrictive interpretation of section 7 was not a problem in the
context

of

sexual

harassment

because

other

laws

provide

adequate

protection for employees seeking assistance from their co-workers. As in

IBM Corp.

the majority thus chose to see the NLRA as applying only in a

narrow range of circumstances.

B.

The Dissent: Civility Not Required

The dissent argued that the majority' s interpretation of the "mutual aid
or protection" prong of section 7 departed from the established rule that
conduct

or

complaints

need

only

involve

terms

or

conditions

of

employment to be protected.71 The fact that only one employee may have
raised

a

claim

of

sexual

harassment

was

relevant

concertedness, but not to mutual aid or protection.72

to

establishing

Since the majority

found that the employee satisfied the concertedness prong, the dissent took
issue with the majority's claim that sexual harassment allegations were not
about the general terms and conditions of employment. The dissent labeled
as "absurd" the proposition that sexual harassment and other forms of
illegal discrimination are too rare to be a matter of mutual interest among
employees.73

While acknowledging that the conduct of the complaining

employee was not laudable, the dissent stated that "Section 7 requires
neither altruism, nor unequivocal solidarity, on the part of an individual
employee who seeks help from coworkers with respect to working
conditions."74 Rather, since the employee's requests to her co-workers were
about

an

issue

68.

/d. at *5.

69.

/d.

that

clearly

involved the

70.

/d. at *4 n. l 7 .

71.

/d. at *7 (Liebman, Member, dissenting).

72.

/d. at *6.

73.

/d. at *7.

74.

!d. at *8.

terms

and

conditions

of

2006
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employment, the requests were for mutual aid or protection, and, thus, her
conduct was protected by section 7.

Critiquing

C.

Holling Press

The majority's suggestion that mutuality depends on the frequency of
the type of conduct and any attendant investigation and its supposition that
sexual harassment and related investigations are rare and isolated is difficult
to understand.

This is particularly true because

IBM Corp.

used the

employer's need to conduct investigations into allegations of harassment as
a basis to overturn existing precedent and deny the
nonunion employees.

IBM Corp.

on

The

Holling Press

Weingarten

right to

majority struggled to distinguish

the ground that sexual harassment allegations lacked a

mutual interest for all employees. Yet, the decisions provide an interesting
juxtaposition: in

the Board found that an employers' need to

IBM Corp.,

conduct sexual harassment investigations was a sufficient reason to deny
the

Weingarten

right to nonunion employees and to restrictively interpret

section 7; while in

Holling Press the Board

claimed that the infrequency of

sexual harassment and attendant investigations was a sufficient reason to
deny section 7 protection to a union employee.

These decisions beg the

question: Are sexual harassment investigations common occurrences such
that the NLRA should be interpreted to facilitate them, or are they so rare
that the NLRA is irrelevant and employees can be left to the protection of
other laws? Instead of allowing the NLRA to be a basis for general worker
protection, the

Holling Press

decision narrowed section 7 rights and left

aggressive employees who irritate their co-employees with their requests or
demands for help, to the possible protection of other laws.
In my earlier article, I stated that the controlling interpretation of "for
mutual aid or protection" was broad enough to cover much conduct.75
Indeed, I argued that in the nonunion setting proving concertedness posed
the greatest obstacle to coverage of nonunion workers.76

Holling Press

has

changed my · assessment.

As the majority suggests, at least in cases

involving

complaints

grievances

or

by

employees,

satisfying

concertedness requirement does not assure section 7 coverage.

Rolling Press

case

with similar

facts,

an administrative

the

In a post
law judge

concluded that an employee' s allegations of sexual harassment were her
concern alone and not for mutual aid or protection.77
While

Holling Press

dealt mainly with the mutuality requirement, it

may also have some influence in cases in which concertedness is the focus.

75.

Corbett, supra note 7, at 282-83.

76.

/d. at 279.

Charles Schwab & Co, Inc., Case 28-CA-1 9445JD(SF)-79-04, 2004 WL 3023 761 , at * 1 1
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Dec. 1 6, 2004).
77.
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It seems that employees who assert complaints against their employers may
fail

to

establish

coverage

under

either

or

both

of

the

section

7

requirements-concertedness or for mutual aid or protection. In Abramson,

LLC,

for example, a contract employee filed, in the midst of a union

organizing campaign, a complaint with the EEOC alleging discrimination in
violation of Title VII. 78 When the employee sought to return to work after
being in the hospital for a short period, the employer proceeded to ask him
for the papers he filed with the EEOC. When the employee acknowledged
signing the papers, the employer told him that there was no work available.
In reviewing the employee's claim that he was terminated for engaging in

protected

section

7 activity,

the Board cited

Holling Press

for the

proposition that both prongs of section 7 must be satisfied for conduct to be
protected.

The majority concluded that the conduct was not concerted

because there was no evidence that the employee discussed his concerns
underlying his EEOC

charge with other employees or sought their

assistance. Rather, he was engaged in a "personal campaign."79 Thus, the
employer's asking questions about unprotected conduct was not an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) ( l ) because it did not interfere with the
employee's exercise of his section 7 rights.

Although

Holling Press

was

decided on the basis of no mutual aid or protection, it was invoked in

Abramson to

buttress a finding of no concertedness.

I noted in my earlier article that Professor Cynthia Estlund and others

had criticized the then-controlling interpretation of for mutual aid or
protection as too narrow because it required a "traditional self-interested
economic objective."80 Notwithstanding that criticism, I argued that Board
precedent established that the scope of for mutual aid or protection was
broad

enough to cover many types of

expressing

or

communicating

views

employee

about

conduct,

employment

including
conditions,

challenging rules that restrict employee communications, and speaking out
against employers.81 Now,

Holling Press

makes clear that the meaning of

mutual aid or protection has been narrowed and can exclude individual
complaints about workplace conditions; ironically, self interest of the
employee now seems to be a basis for finding lack of

mutual aid or

protection.

78.

345 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 2005 WL 2094928 at *3 (Aug. 26, 2005).

79.

Jd. at *4.

80. Corbett, supra note 7, at 283 (quoting Cynthia Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee
Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 92 1 , 928 ( 1 992) and citing Richard Michael Fischl, Self. Others, and Section 7: Mutualism
and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 8 1 61 9 ( 1 989)).
81.

See Corbett, supra note 7, at 286-96.
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IV.
L UTHERAN HERITAGE VILLA GE-LIVONIA HOME,

INC. : NARROWING

RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYER RULES
One of the ways in which the NLRA provides protection to both union
and

nonunion

employees

is

by

declaring employer

rules restricting

communications among employees unlawful as unfair labor practices.
my prior article,
established by

In

I discussed the Board's analysis of such rules as

Lafayette Park Hotel. 82

In that decision, the Board held that

the mere maintenance of anti-communication rules may be an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(a) ( l ) without regard to their application if
they are likely to have a chilling effect on section 7 rights. I also discussed
several Board and court decisions in which the Board and some courts had
found employer prohibitory rules to violate section 8(a)(1).83 In one case I
discussed,

Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, NA., Inc. , the
Lafayette Park Hotel analysis and found that an employer's

Board used the

rule prohibiting "abusive or threatening language" was an unfair labor
practice.84

However, the D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's

order, calling it "simply preposterous" to interpret the NLRA as prohibiting
employers from maintaining civility in the workplace. 85
In

Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia Home, Inc.,86 a 3-2 decision, the
Lafayette Park Hotel,

Board, while not expressly abrogating the analysis of

evaluated employer rules restricting employee conduct differently than
other Board decisions. The Board embraced the D.C. Circuit's analysis in

Adtranz and suggested
Lafayette Park HatelY

that it might have reached a different result in
The

Lutheran Heritage

decision signals an easing

of NLRA restrictions on at least certain types of employer rules regarding
employee communications.

After

Lutheran Heritage,

rules that restrict

aggressive, hostile, or offensive speech are likely to be upheld under the
rationale that employees would not understand them as restricting speech
protected by section 7.

A.
In

The Majority: Rules to Ensure a Civil, Decent,
and Harassment-Free Workplace

Lutheran Heritage,

the Board considered a number of rules

maintained by an employer.

The Board held that the rules prohibiting

82. 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced sub nom. Lafayette Park Hotel v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1 999).
83.

Corbett, supra note 7, at 291-95.

84.

3 3 1 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000), enforcement denied, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

85.

Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 28.

86.

343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 (Nov. 1 9, 2004).

at *5 n.9 ("We do not pass on the validity of Lafayette Park Hotel . . . insofar as it held
unlawful a rule prohibiting ' false, vicious, profane or malicious statements."').
87.

!d.
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"abusive and profane language," "harassment," and "verbal, mental and
physical abuse" were lawful. Finding that the rules by their terms did hot
explicitly restrict conduct protected by section 7, the Board then turned to
whether employees could reasonably construe the rules to prohibit section 7
conduct, whether the employer promulgated the rules in response to union
activity, or whether the employer applied the rules in ways to restrict
section 7 conduct.88
D.C. Circuit's

Focusing on the first prong, the Board followed the

Adtranz

analysis and explained that these rules "serve

legitimate business purposes: they are designed to maintain order in the
workplace and to protect the [employer] from liability by prohibiting
conduct that, if permitted, could result in such liability."89
explained

that

reasonable

employees

would

interpret

The majority
the

rules

as

"ensur[ing] a civil and decent workplace"90 and not as prohibiting section 7
protected conduct.

Specifically, regarding the rule prohibiting harassment,

the majority stated that employees have a right to a workplace that is free of
unlawful harassing conduct.91

The majority noted that its holding meant

only that the maintenance of such rules was not an unfair labor practice and
that applications of those rules to specific conduct might still be found to be
an unfair labor practice.

B.
The

The Dissent: Civility Not Required by Section

Lutheran Heritage

interest in

7

dissent acknowledged that employers have an

maintaining a civil workplace and

avoiding liability for

harassment under federal and state laws.92 However, the dissent argued that
employees could interpret ambiguous rules in a way that placed them in
tension with section 7 rights, and that those competing interests must be
balanced.
terms

For example, the dissent argued that the rule's use of vague

without

examples

could

leave

employees

uncertain

condemning a supervisor's treatment of a co-employee might

run

whether
afoul of

the prohibition of "abusive or profane language . . . directed toward a
supervisor," or, whether using a word like "scab," a disparaging term often
used by union supporters, might violate the prohibition of "abusive
language." Responding to the

Adtranz rationale

that such rules are needed

by employers to help them avoid liability for sexual and other prohibited
harassment, the dissent pointed out that the employer had two rules
prohibiting verbal abuse, and a separate rule (in addition to the general
harassment

rule)

covering

sexual

harassment,

rendering

the

general

88. /d. at *2-3.
89. !d. at *3.
90. !d.
9 1 . !d. at *4.
92 . Lutheran Heritage, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 at *6 (Nov. 1 9, 2004) (Liebman

and Walsh, Members, dissenting).
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harassment rule inapplicable to sexual harassment. Accordingly, the dissent
found the employer's rules to be overbroad.93
The dissent took no consolation in the majority's assertion that
application of the rules could be an unfair labor practice.

The concern

undergirding the

maintenance

Lafayette Park Hotel analysis is that the mere

of such rules chills protected activity.94 The dissent would have rejected the

Adtranz

analysis, which had not previously been accepted by the Board.

When workplace terms and conditions are the subject, the dissent noted,
tempers sometimes flare, and "[s]ection 7 is not limited to amiable or
decorous communications. "95

Critiquing Lutheran Heritage

C.

By accepting the D.C. Circuit's

Adtranz

analysis, the Board majority

clearly diverged from its recent precedents analyzing employer rules
prohibiting workplace conduct and communications.

In focusing on

employer concerns with maintaining a civil and decent workplace and
avoiding liability, this decision is similar to

IBM Corp.

Both cases balance

the employee's right to engage in section 7 activity with the employer's
concerns about other legal restrictions and potential liability by narrowing
the scope of NLRA protection and easing the burden on employers.
According to the Board, employers can adopt broad restrictive rules without
fear of violating the NLRA.
The few Board

decisions dealing with rules

prohibiting certain

workplace conduct since

Lutheran Heritage have produced mixed results.
On the one hand, in three decisions, Fiesta Hotel Corp.,96 Guardsmark,97
and Stanadyne Automotive Corp.,98 the Board applied Lutheran Heritage to
uphold employer rules restricting employee communication or conduct. In

Fiesta Hotel Corp.

the Board found that a rule that prohibited employees

from engaging in "conduct which is or has the effect of being injurious,
offensive, threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with [other
employees]" was valid.99

As in

Lutheran Heritage,

the dissent cautioned

that the decision "threatens to allow employers to take advantage of the
chilling effect of ambiguous rules. "100 In Guardsmark, the Board applied
Lutheran Heritage to find lawful an employer rule prohibiting fraternization
on- or off-duty and dating or becoming overly friendly with a client' s

at *8.

93.

!d.

94.
95.

at *6-7.
!d. at *9.

96.

344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 5 9, 2005 WL 1 9 1 85977, at *7 (Aug. 1 5, 2005).

!d.

97.

344 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 2005 WL 1 3 78568 (June 7, 2005).

98.

345 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 2005 WL 23421 1 1 (Aug. 24, 2005).

99.
1 00.

Fiesta Hotel Corp., 2005 WL 1 9 1 85977, at * I .
!d.

at * 1 2 (Liebman, Member, dissenting).
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employees or co-employees.
anti-fraternization

provision

The dissent found that the inclusion of the
rendered

the

rule

susceptible
interpretation that it prohibited conduct protected by section 7. 1 0 1

to

an

In Stanadyne Automotive, the president and CEO of the company made
a statement in a meeting with employees during a union organizing
campaign in which he said that he understood that some union supporters
were harassing fellow employees, that employees could be for the company
or the union, but that "no one should be harassed [and] [h]arassment of any
type is :not tolerated by this company and will be dealt with." 1 02 The
president' s statements were initially found to constitute an unfair labor
practice because

his language was

so broad that employees

could

reasonably believe that conduct protected by section 7 would come within
the term harassment and would not be tolerated.

Applying the Lutheran

Heritage analysis, the Board majority reversed the ALJ. Invoking the threat

of employer liability under other laws, the Board said, "In view of the
various State and Federal laws that place affirmative obligations upon
employers to address workplace harassment, an employer reasonably would
react to reports of harassment by informing employees that such conduct
will not b e tolerated." 1 03 The majority then held that the rule was not
promulgated in response to union activity and that employees would not
reasonably understand the rule against harassment as prohibiting section 7
protected conduct. 1 04 The dissent disagreed with the majority on both the
purpose

behind

the

promulgation
5

of the

rule

and

the

reasonable

understanding of the employees. 1 0

On the other hand, the Board has also applied Lutheran Heritage to
strike down employer rules.
requiring

confidentiality

In Cintas Corp. the Board invalidated a rule

of various

types

of

information,

such

as

information concerning the company, its business plans, its partners, new
6
business efforts, customers, accounting, and financial matters. 1 0 The Board
held that the rule' s "unqualified prohibition of the release of 'any
information' regarding 'its partners' could be reasonably construed by
employees to restrict discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of
employment with their fellow employees and with the Union." 1 07 In KSL
Claremont Resort, Inc., the Board found that a rule prohibiting "negative

conversations" about

101.

associates

or managers

also

unfairly

restricted

Guardsmark, 2005 W L 1 3 78568, at * 8 (Liebman, Member, dissenting).

1 02.

Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 2005 WL 2342 1 1 1 , at *3.

1 03.

/d. at *4.

104.

Stanadyne Automotive Corp., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 2005 WL 2342 1 1 at *4 (Aug. 24, 2005).

105.

/d. at * 1 3 (Liebman, Member, dissenting in part).

106.

344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 1 8, 2005 W L 1 564863 (June 30, 2005).

1 07.

/d. at * I .
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These cases suggest that, notwithstanding the broad

deference accorded employers in developing and maintaining workplace
rules under

Lutheran Heritage,

rules that can reasonably be understood to

prohibit employees' discussions of wages and other terms and conditions of
employment will still be unlawful.
While some rules have been struck down, the approach advocated by

Lutheran Heritage

makes

broad

rules

prohibiting

certain

types

of

communications and conduct by employees toward other employees more
likely to survive an unfair labor practice charge.

It is predictable that

employers, with the imprimatur of the NLRB, will adopt and maintain such
rules and that employees will be disciplined for their violation.

Holling Press

While

insulates employers who discipline employees on an ad hoc

basis for aggressive or hostile communications, Lutheran Heritage insulates
employers who adopt prophylactic rules regarding such conduct. Together
these Board decisions make it more difficult for employees to associate and
to discuss problems of mutual concern if such discussions may at times be
heated or uncivil.

This is a troubling approach because the Board should

know that the history of labor relations demonstrates that employee
interactions about terms and conditions of employment often do not
resemble polite parlor talk.

It is predictable that the decisions and the

Board's new elevation of civility over employee communication will have a
chilling effect on expression and communication.
v.

POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE THREE DECISIONS: NARROWING
SECTION 7 RIGHTS
Are these three decisions harbingers of the demise of the NLRA or just
three Board decisions in which the Republican and Democratic members of
the Board disagreed? While it is too soon to predict the full ramifications
and impact of these three Board decisions, it is clear that these decisions, as
long as they stand, narrow the scope of section 7 rights for employees
represented by a union and render the NLRA less applicable to nonunion
employees.
All three decisions involved the relationship between the NLRA and
other laws, principally federal and state anti-discrimination laws, and in
each case the Board interpreted the NLRA narrowly and left the employee
without a remedy.
actions

that

In

IBM Corp.

conceivably

and

might

Lutheran Heritage

help

them

avoid

employers took
liability

under

discrimination laws. The Board majority restricted the scope of the NLRA
in order to enable employers to meet their obligations and assuage their

108.

344 N.L.R.B. No. 1 05, 2005 WL 1452400, at * I (June 16, 2005).
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concerns under these other laws. Holling Press presents a different pattern.
There an employee made claims under state discrimination laws, and when
she was fired for aggressively soliciting a co-employee to assist her with
her harassment claim she sought protection under the NLRA. Just as it did
in the other cases, the Board narrowly interpreted the NLRA to help
employers either avoid possible liability to meet supposed obligations under
discrimination laws.
Another feature common to the three decisions is their treatment of
civility and decorum in the workplace.

Lack of civility and respect for

other people has been an important topic of discussion in our society in
recent years. 1 09

One facet of that broader discussion is how these issues

impact the workplace. l l0 In Holling Press, the Board used the aggressive
nature of the employee's solicitation for help to classify her conduct as
benefiting only herself and not for mutual aid or protection.

In Lutheran

Heritage, the Board discussed the right of employers to establish a "civil

and decent work place" and permited the adoption of a broad prophylactic
rule to help accomplish that objective. In IBM Corp., the Board sought to
help employers investigate claims of harassment by removing the legal
protection for nonunion employees who assist each other during such
investigations.

The dissent in Lutheran Heritage responded to this

solicitude for civility by declaring that section 7 protected conduct is not
always "amiable and decorous," 1 1 1

and the dissent in Holling Press

protested that
solidarity." 1 1 2

neither altruism,

section

7

"requires

nor unequivocal

The point of this essay is not that the Board is reaching ridiculous
results or trying to hurt employees. IBM Corp. is a return to a position the
Board has taken before, and even though I disagree with the decisions in

109.

The most discussed recent survey regarding Americans' attitudes about incivility is one

conducted

by Public

Agenda and

funded

by

the

Pew

Charitable Trusts.

PUBLIC

AGENDA,

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: A STATUS REPORT ON RUDENESS IN AMERJCA (2002); see also James
Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, I 09 YALE L.J. 1 279, 1 280 (2000) ("It has
become common, over the last decade or so, to plead for more 'civility' and 'respect ' in American daily
life.").

I 10.

See, e.g., Symposium on Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 235 (2004); Anita

Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, I l l HARV. L. REv. 445, 450 ( 1 997); Catherine L.
Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (200 1 ); David C . Yamada, The

Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying " and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000); Marilyn Elias, Study: Rudeness is Poisoning U.S. Workplace, USA
TODAY, June I 4, 200 1 , at D I ; Pat Karlak, RUDE, RUDE, RUDE: Workplace Incivility Is on the Rise

and Companies Are Taking Notice, CHJ DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 200 1 , Suburban Living, at I ; Effects
.

of Workplace Incivility Widespread, Likely to Linger, Research Study Concludes, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. I 1 7, at A-4 (June 19, 2001).

1 J I.

Lutheran Heritage, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004 WL 2678632 at *9 (Nov. I 9, 2004) (Liebman

and Walsh, Members, dissenting).
1 1 2.

Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2004 WL 2368662, at *8 (Oct. 15, 2004) (Liebman,

Member, dissenting).
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Lutheran Heritage, they
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do not seem beyond the pale of

reason to me. However, taking the three decisions together, I see the Board
narrowing the section 7 rights of employees and thus narrowing protection
under the NLRA.

Although this is true for both union and nonunion

employees, it is even more so for nonunion employees.
With these three decisions, the vision I had of an NLRA that could
provide important rights and protections to nonunion employees is blurring.
And with it, the relevance of the Act in the workplaces of the twenty-first
century,

which

are

predominantly

nonunion,113

and

in

employment law regime of the United States is waning.

the

overall

The agency

charged with interpreting and enforcing the National Labor Relations Act is
narrowing and marginalizing it.

Although there can be good reasons for

narrow interpretations of laws, I question whether the Board has given good
reasons in these cases.

In each decision the Board elevates employers'

desires to avoid liability under other laws and to ensure civility and
decorum in the workplace and subordinates the rights of workers to engage
in protected concerted activity for mutual aid or protection-the rights which
Congress entrusted to the Board for interpretation and enforcement.

As

important as the employers' goals are, the objectives of the NLRA also are
important, and they should extend to employees engaged in section 7
conduct, regardless of whether they are represented by a union.

If the

National Labor Relations Board does not proclaim the importance of the
National Labor Relations Act and elevate it above other laws with which it

might conflict who

1 13.

Supra note 4.

will?

